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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
DOUGLAS MCKAY, JR.*
In General
As in the past, this subject embraces a hodge-podge of dif-
ferent and unrelated topics. Some of the topics involve rem-
edies, others procedures, and yet others, forums. I have
grouped the cases inside the following headings:
(1) Contempt of Court
(2) Declaratory Judgments
(3) Form or Sufficiency of Objections
(4) Intervention of Parties
(5) Instructions to Jury
(6) Matters Appealable
(7) Non-suit and Direction of Verdict
(8) Power of Judge after Term
(9) References
(10) Service of Process
(11) Re-opening Default Judgments
(12) Venue.
I have not attempted to review all cases affecting practice
and procedure, but have sought to cover the main ones.
Contempt of Court
In State v. Weinberg,' the defendant was found guilty of
constructive contempt because he attempted to influence cer-
tain persons drawn for jury duty during a term of court in
which proceedings were pending against the defendant's son.
Neither of the men solicited by the defendant were called on
the jury which tried the defendant's son but the lower court,
affirmed by the Supreme Court, found the defendant guilty.
Where there is deliberate purpose to corrupt administra-
tion of justice, accompanied by definite overt act on
part of contemnor, designed to carry purpose into effect,
notwithstanding failure of design, one is guilty of con-
tempt.
One interfering with or attempting to interfere with the
"Miember of the firm of McKay, McKay, Black & Walker, Colum-
bia, S. C.
1. 229 S. C. 286, 92 S. E. 2d 842 (1956).
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proper execution of legal process, or with an attempt,
either on the bench or off, to influence the Court in
its decision of a matter pending before it may be held
guilty of contempt, . . . and all willful attempts, of
whatever nature, seeking to improperly influence jurors
in the impartial discharge of their duties, whether it be
by conversations or discussions, or attempts to bribe,
constitute contempts....
.... We cannot condemn too strongly any attempted in-
terference with the jury, whether the attempt be success-
ful or not; not even the love of the father for his son
is justification for appellant's conduct, and the hearing
judge's decision that appellant was guilty of contempt
was justified by the evidence.
Jurors Boseman and DuBose are to be commended for re-
porting appellant's conduct to the trial judge as the very
heart of our system of jurisprudence is the jury; an un-
just jury means an unjust Court.
Declaratory Judgments
In City of Columbia v. Sanders, et al.,2 a declaratory judg-
ment was sought to ascertain the right of the City of Colum-
bia, as it existed prior to its merger with the City of Eau
Claire, to issue further revenue bonds, on a parity with those
outstanding, for the purpose of improving its water and sewer
facilities. The proceeding also inquired whether the utility
systems of the two cities as they existed prior to the merger
had to be maintained separately thereafter in order to pro-
tect the various liens and priorities of bond holders and
others in the separate systems as they existed prior to the
merger. On appeal the Supreme Court stated that there
was doubt whether the pleadings presented a proper case
for any kind of declaratory relief, but since the rule requir-
ing the existence of a justiciable controversy was somewhat
relaxed where the public interest was involved the Court
would make a limited declaration with respect to the issuance
of further revenue bonds. The Court noted that the City
of Columbia had segregated the revenues from the systems
formerly operated by Eau Claire and Columbia and that
no contest had arisen between the holders of the Eau Claire
bonds and the holders of the bonds issued by Columbia. For
2. 231 S. C. 61, 97 S. E. 2d 210 (1957).
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this reason the Court declined to go into the question of co-
mingling of funds, rank or priority of existing liens, and
the extent of claims that holders of the Eau Claire bonds
might have upon the revenues of the entire system.
We need not speculate as to what controversies may arise
in the future. In short, we refuse to make any declara-
tion for adjudication as to the rights of the existing
bond holders inter sese.
The uniform declaratory judgment act . .. "does not re-
quire the Court to give a purely advisory opinion which
the parties might, so to speak, put on ice to be used if
and when occasion might arise" . . . or "license litigants
to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice." (Emphasis and
omissions mine.)
In Wright, et al., v. City of Florence,3 two members of the
Civil Service Commission proceeded against the City, the
Chief of Police and others, for a declaratory judgment deter-
mining the validity of an ordinance repealing an earlier ordi-
nance whereby the Civil Service Commission was established.
The Chief of Police instituted a cross-claim wherein he con-
tended that the repeal of the ordinance creating the Civil
Service Commission was designed to deprive him of his job
in violation of his contractual rights. It was decided by the
lower court on the pleadings. On appeal the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court and dissolved the injunction which
it had issued. The Court held that the statute under which
the City had originally adopted its ordinance creating a Civil
Service Commission was permissive and not mandatory so
that the City had the inherent right to repeal its ordinance
creating the Commission. The Supreme Court, however, dis-
missed the contention of the Chief of Police that his contrac-
tual rights had been unconstitutionally impaired by the repeal
of the ordinance because that contention had not been decided
by the lower court and, therefore, was not available to the
Police Chief as a ground to sustain the judgment of the lower
court. The Court ruled that the Chief's contention would de-
pend upon the facts, evidence of which had not been adduced
below and that this action was not the proper form of action
for the adjudication of the Chief's claim.
3. 229 S. C. 419, 95 S. E. 2d 215 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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.... It is not that a City lacks power to repeal its ordi-
nances, but that to the extent that the repeal affects
vested rights or contractual obligations it may be in-
operative. Even in such a case, however, the Court will
not ordinarily attempt to control the action of the Munici-
pal Council, and if the council considers the public interest
requires the repeal of an ordinance, in violation of a
contract in the Municipality, the Court will not compel
the specific performance of the contract but will leave
the injured party to his remedy at law.
Form or Sufficiency of Objection
In an action wherein the manufacturer of a farm tractor
was charged with breach of implied warranty of fitness, the
defendant in Odom v. Ford Motor Company4 contended that
there was no privity of contract between it and the plaintiff
who had purchased the tractor from a dealer. The defendant
appealed from an adverse verdict on the ground inter alia
that the lower court erred in refusing to direct a verdict
or grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant.
On appeal the plaintiff respondent opposed the question of
lack of privity because it was not included in the grounds
of the motions for non-suit and directed verdict. The Su-
preme Court in overruling respondent's contention held:
While privity of contract was not mentioned eo nomine,
appellant's position throughout the trial was that the
only liability assumed by it was under the written war-
ranty set up in the answer and if there was any other
warranty made at the time of the purchase of the trac-
tor, it was the sole obligation of Sansbury Tractor Com-
pany which was not its agent and was without authority
to bind it in any manner whatsoever. After careful con-
sideration of the grounds of the motion for non-suit
and directed verdict it is our conclusion that they are
broad enough to raise the question as to whether an
action could be maintained against appellant on an im-
plied warranty. It was not necessary for appellant to
"brief" the point. It should be further stated that the
element of privity of contract was specifically mentioned
and argued on appellant's motion for judgment non ob-
stante veredicto and it appears that respondent's counsel
4. 230 S. C. 320, 95 S. E. 2d 601 (1956).
19571
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participated in the argument of this question without
reservation or objection. Evidently they then thought it
was properly before the Court.
Two cases consider the method of objecting to want of
capacity to sue. In Bramlett v. Young5 the Supreme Court
says:
The appellants assert that the respondents herein had
no legal capacity to bring this action. An examination
of the petition shows upon its face the capacity in which
the respondents brought action. Hence, since the capacity
in which the respondents instituted this action appears
upon the face of the complaint, if the appellants desired
to take advantage of or question the right to bring the
action, the appellants remedy was to demur to the com-
plaint.... This they did not do, and since the objection
was not made by demurrer, it is considered waived....
If the fact that the respondents had no legal capacity
to sue did not appear upon the face of the petition, then
the appellants should take advantage of such by way of
answer.... (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
In Clanton's Auto Auction Sales v. Campbell" the ownership
of an automobile was in issue and the Supreme Court had
occasion to consider whether or not a general denial or a
denial "upon information and belief" was sufficient to raise
the issue of ownership alleged in the complaint. The Court
also discussed the effect of a simple denial as being sufficient
to raise an issue whether made categorically or on information
and belief.
Denial in either of the forms just mentioned with re-
spect to the plaintiff's capacity to sue, or to facts pre-
sumptively within the defendant's knowledge, or to mat-
ters of public record, is not sufficient to put such facts
in issue.
Thus it was held in Land Mortgage Investment & Agency
Company v. Williams7 . .. that the plaintiff's corporate
existence had not been put in issue by defendant's denial
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to it .... See also Blackwell v. First National Bank of
Columbia where allegations charging a bank with negli-
6. 229 S. C. 519, 93 S. E. 873, 881 (1956).
6. 230 S. C. 65, 94 S. E. 2d 172 (1956).
7. 35 S. C. 367, 14 S. E. 821 (1891).
8. 185 S. C. 427, 194 S. E. 339 (1937).
[Vol. 10
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gence in having failed to ascertain the identity of a person
presenting a check endorsed by the plaintiff were held not
to have been effectively controverted by the bank's denial
of them "upon information and belief".
In the case at bar it will be noted that in paragraph 3
of the first defense the denial of plaintiff's ownership
of the Ford automobile is categorical and not upon infor-
mation and belief. But apart from that denial upon in-
formation and belief in paragraph 4 was sufficient to put
plaintiff's ownership in issue. Such ownership was not
a matter of public record or presumptively within de-
fendant's knowledge, and to put plaintiff to the proof
of it did not require specific and unqualified denial.
Moreover if, as plaintiff contends, the denial was insuf-
ficient its insufficiency was apparent on the face of the
first defense, rendering that defense subject to demur-
rer. But plaintiff did not demur, and obviously con-
sidered the issue of ownership as having been raised,
for it offered evidence thereabout. (Omissions mine.)
Intervention of Parties
In Long Manufacturing Co. v. Manning Tractor CoY the
manufacturer of machinery had brought suit against its
dealer for balance due on machines sold by the manufacturer
to the dealer. Thereafter the dealer and certain other persons
who had bought machines from the dealer moved that such
others be made parties - defendant on the ground that the
machines purchased by them had been defective and the
purchasers and dealer desired to assert counter-claims against
the plaintiff. The Circuit Judge denied the motion and was
sustained by the Supreme Court.
The Court decided that the petitioners seeking to become
parties did not come within the provisions of Section 10-203,.
Code of Laws of South Carolina 1952, permitting a person
to be made a defendant "who has or claims an interest in the
controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary
party to a complete determination of settlement of the ques-
tions involved," nor did they come within the provisions of
Section 10-219, Code of Laws of 1952, permitting the Court
to bring in other parties "when a complete determination of
the controversy could not be had without their presence." The
9. 229 S. C. 301, 92 S. E. 2d 700 (1956).
19571
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Court held that the controversy lay between the plaintiff
manufacturer and the defendant dealer; and none of the pe-
titioners were liable for the debt of the dealer to the manu-
facturer. Since any liability would be the sole obligation of
the dealer, the Court found that a complete determination
of the controversy could be had without bringing in the peti-
tioners as additional parties. In any event, the bringing in
of additional parties would have been left much to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.
Instructions to the Jury in the Language of the Statute
In Field v. Gregory,10 involving a collision between motor
vehicles, the appellant objected that the trial judge failed to
charge a request submitted by appellant as to the law appli-
cable where two vehicles enter an intersection at approxi-
mately the same time. The Supreme Court, observing that
the trial judge had charged the specific language of the Code
Section around which appellant's requested instruction was
modeled, said:
As a general rule where the law governing a case is ex-
pressed in a statute, the Court in its charge not only may,
but should, use the language of the statute, and may,
indeed, be guilty of error if it employs language which
constitutes a departure in an essential respect from the
statute. However, it is not error to qualify the wording
of the statute so as to conform it to the construction
given by the reviewing courts....
The particular complaint of the appellants is that the
Court failed to explain as to what "entering an intersec-
tion at approximately the same time" meant. It is well
settled that words used in a statute must be given their
ordinary and popular signification, unless there is some-
thing in the statute requiring a different interpretation.
There are no words used in this statute which have any
unusual legal meaning. When the Judge charged the
jury in the language of the statute, this was sufficient
in this particular case.... (Omissions mine.)
Matters Appealable
In Re Paslay's Appeal" involved some rather interesting
facts. The petitioner had secured an order in the lower court
10. 230 S. C. 39, 94 S. E. 2d 15 (1956).
11. 230 S. C. 55, 94 S. E. 2d 57 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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enjoining the Master from delivering a deed to property
bid in at a judicial sale on several grounds including one
that the property had been sold at an inadequate price and
another rather novel ground that petitioners had been pre-
pared through their attorney to bid considerably more for
the property and the attorney "made every reasonable effort
to attend the sale, but due to mechanical failure of his auto-
mobile at a distance from the place of sale, he was unable
to arrive at the place of sale" on time. The respondents ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court from the order granting the
injunction and the petitioner below moved to dismiss the
appeal in the Supreme Court on grounds that the order of
the circuit court was not appealable. The Supreme Court
sustained the appeal saying:
Appeal lay from the restraining order or temporary in-
junction. Section 15-123(4) of the Code of 1952 auth-
orizes appeal from, quoting, "an interlocutory order or
decree in a Court of Common Pleas granting, continuing,
modifying or refusing an injunction .... "
We have found that the restraining order or injunction
was improvidently issued; there was no merit in the
petition and the returns should have been adjudged suf-
ficient and the petition dismissed. It follows that it was
an error to refer the matter to the Master. (Omissions
mine.)
In another case involving the appealability of order of the
lower court, Sparks v. D. M. Dew & Sons, Inc., 12 the Circuit
Judge refused to order that certain allegations be stricken
from the complaint upon the ground that they were irrelevant
and redundant and the defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal holding:
An order refusing to strike allegations in pleadings as
irrelevant and redundant is not appealable ....
Upon trial, however, appellant will not by the order ap-
pealed from or this opinion be precluded or in any wise
prejudiced in its efforts to exclude such testimony as
may be offered in support of the allegation sought to be
stricken from the complaint. Appeal dismissed.
12. 230 S. C. 507, 96 S. E. 2d 488 (1957).
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Non-Suit and Direction of Verdict
In Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company,'3
plaintiff in an action for wrongful death, moved for and was
granted a voluntary non-suit without prejudice for the pur-
pose of procuring a proper appointment as administratrix,
it being conceded that she was not duly appointed when the
action was instituted. In its order the lower court also at-
tempted to pass upon the rights of the alleged beneficiaries
in a subsequent action which might be brought and the de-
fendant appealed, not only from the granting of the non-
suit but, also, from the ruling as to the rights of beneficiaries
in future actions. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court in result, but stated:
It was unnecessary and thereby improper to pass upon
the "rights" of the alleged beneficiaries and any subse-
quent action which may be brought. It was therefore
error to do so, and the soundness of the conclusions will
not be examined; appellants pertinent contentions of
error are saved for re-assertion by them in any future
action which may be brought upon the same cause, if
they be so advised .... Ordinarily, as here, a plaintiff
is entitled on Motion before trial to an Order of volun-
tary non-suit without prejudice, in the absence of re-
sulting legal prejudice to the defendant .... Appellants
argue only the difficulty in locating their witnesses, if a
new action should be brought and tried; but liability
to defend another action does not constitute legal preju-
dice. (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
In Chastain v. United Insurance Company,'4 plaintiff sued
defendant charging that it had refused to pay or honor cer-
tain hospital sickness claims and had wrongfully, unlawfully
and fraudulently lapsed her hospital and sickness insurance
policy. The respondent admitted issuing the policy but con-
tended that it had exercised its option, reserved in the policy,
to refuse to renew the same, and had declined to pay the
claim presented because the sickness involved was not con-
tracted during the term of the policy as required therein.
The trial judge, at the close of plaintiff's case, granted a non-
suit on the ground that the only reasonable conclusion to be
13. 229 S. C. 329, 92 S. E. 2d 847 (1956).
14. 230 S. C. 465, 96 S. E. 2d 464 (1957).
[Vol. 10
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reached was that plaintiff's condition existed prior to the
issuance of the policy and was not covered by its terms.
On the question of the alleged wrongful lapse of the policy
the Supreme Court said:
It must be borne in mind that we are here dealing with
a divisible insurance contract and not a continuous con-
tract of insurance for life subject to forfeiture for non-
payment of premiums. The policy in question is for a
definite and fixed term. It can correctly be denominated
a term policy. It cannot be renewed or continued with-
out the consent of both parties. When the insurer re-
fused to consent to a renewal of the contract, it was
acting within the reserved rights under the policy. Hav-
ing so acted the insured cannot complain....
The Court then considered whether or not the claim came
within the policy clause insuring "against loss of time on
account of sickness contracted during the term of the policy".
The record disclosed the fact that the cancer from which
claimant suffered had been treated surgically before the policy
in question had been taken out, which fact was established by
plaintiff's own witness, a surgeon. The Court concluded that
the Circuit Judge correctly held the evidence was susceptible
of only the one reasonable inference that the appellant had
cancer prior to the delivery of the policy.
Since there was only one reasonable inference that could
be deduced from the evidence, it became a question of
law for the Court. It was proper, therefore, for the
Trial Judge to grant a non-suit.
In Young v. Charleston and Western Carolina Railway
Company,15 action was brought against the railroad for the
wrongful death of one Bennie Young who, apparently, after
consuming a quart of whiskey, lay down at night on the rail-
road track where he was struck by the train. The Supreme
Court, by divided opinion, held the railroad liable under the
Last Clear Chance Doctrine and left it up to the jury to de-
termine whether or not the railroad was negligent in failing
to provide sufficient lights to apprehend the prostrate de-
cedent on its track.
There being sufficient evidence regarding one of the
specifications as to require consideration of a jury, the
15. 229 S. C. 580, 93 S. E. 2d 866 (1956).
19571
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motion for non-suit, directed verdict, and judgment non
obstante veredicto were properly over-ruled ....
Under the doctrine of Last Clear Chance, which prevails
in this State, even though the deceased negligently ex-
posed himself to a risk of danger while intoxicated or
became intoxicated after a negligent exposure to danger,
if he was upon the track in a helpless condition and
those in charge of the train discovered him, or in the
exercise of ordinary care should have discovered him in
such a perilous situation in time to avoid injury to him
by the exercise of ordinary care, the railroad company
would be liable. (Omissions mine.)
Power of Judge after Term
In Barnett v. Piedmont Shirt Corporation,16 the Circuit
Judge had heard defendant's demurrer during the term and
filed his Order sustaining the demurrer after the term had
ended and he had left the Circuit. In the Order the judge neg-
lected to give the plaintiff the right to amend and when
plaintiff's ex parte called this to the judge's attention he
granted a leave to file an amended answer under a supple-
mental Order in which he stated inter alia:
It was my intention to grant plaintiff the right to amend
her complaint if she should be so advised, but I inad-
vertently omitted inserting a provision in said Order to
this effect.
Defendant appealed from the second Order on the ground
that the Circuit Judge lacked jurisdiction to issue it and the
Supreme Court held:
The power of a Circuit Judge, after he has left the Cir-
cuit, to issue an order on a matter heard by him while
presiding within the Circuit, is unquestioned .... Judge
Moss' Order of January 20, 1956, sustaining the demur-
rer, was as effective and as final, as if it had been issued
during the term at which he had presided. Upon its issu-
ance his jurisdiction of the matter, except for the correc-
tion of merely clerical errors, ended ....
In the case before us the Order of February 8, 1956, in-
volved material amendment of the Order of January 20th,
not correction of a mere clerical error. Under the au-
thorities before cited, we are of the opinion that Judge
16. 230 S. C. 34, 94 S. E. 2d 1 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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Moss was without jurisdiction to issue it, and that it
was therefore, null and void.
References
The two cases hereinafter reviewed consider respectively
the questions: first, when may a reference be ordered in a law
case, and second, what procedures must be followed by a
referee in receiving evidence and preparing his report in a
case where a reference is required.
In Taylor v. Cecil's Inc., et al.,17 the plaintiff, a subcontrac-
tor on a school construction project, brought suit against the
prime contractor, his surety, and others for balances allegedly
due him for work performed on the job. Certain other par-
ties were permitted to intervene and file claims against plain-
tiff and certain of the defendants for materials supplied to
the project and various answers and defenses between the
various parties ensued. Over objection of the defendant
trustees, a general order of reference was made whereby
all issues were referred to the Master to take the testimony and
report his findings of facts and conclusions of law, the lower
court having concluded:
That the answers raised equitable issues and that the
numerous transactions would involve long and tedious
accounts, which warranted reference rather than trial
by jury.
The defendant trustees appealed and their appeal was sus-
tained by the Supreme Court which said:
The action is at law and the pleadings do not indicate
such long and complicated accounts that it would not be
practicable for a properly instructed jury to comprehend
and adjust the issues between the parties. An account
must not only be long, but so complicated as to be beyond
the comprehension and finding of the jury, in order for
the action to be compulsorily referable ....
The Supreme Court observed that the only "accounting" re-
ferred to in the pleadings was in a reply by plaintiff to one
of the counterclaims wherein plaintiff claimed a percentage
discount on certain purchases. The Court said:
. . . complication in the required calculation is not evi-
dent, if the claims to the discounts should be sustained
by the evidence found by the verdict of the jury.
17. 229 S. C. 182, 94 S. E. 2d 268 (1956).
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The Code provides that the reference statute shall not be
construed, "so as to deprive any party of a trial by jury
of any case or issue upon which he is entitled to a trial
by jury as a matter of right under the practice in effect
prior to February 7, 1928." . . . the trustees would be
so deprived in this case if the order of reference should
be affirmed. (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
In a divorce proceeding, Elrod v. Elrod,'8 the Supreme
Court reversed the order of the lower court granting the
plaintiff husband a divorce against his wife for desertion
and remanded the case for further proceedings below. When
the case was initially heard by the Special Referee the Referee
on several occasions had refused the defendant the right to
put in the record certain testimony which the referee thought
was inadmissible. Furthermore, the Referee's report con-
tained no statement of facts but merely an averment that:
After careful consideration of all the testimony and the
plaintiff's deposition herein, I find as a fact that the
material allegations of the complaint herein are true
and correct in their entirety.
The Supreme Court, commenting on the Referee's refusal
to receive the testimony, held:
It was the duty of the Referee to take all testimony of-
fered even though he regarded it as inadmissible . ...
Section 10-1409 (South Carolina Code, 1952) requires a
Master or Referee to decide any objection made to testi-
mony and if deemed inadmissible, "he shall take the same,
subject to such objection, but shall not incorporate such
testimony so held by him inadmissible with the rest of the
testimony in the body of his report but shall append the
same separately at the end of his report."
The Special Referee in this case clearly erred in refus-
ing to follow the foregoing procedure and we cannot say
that such error was not prejudicial.
The Supreme Court ruled that the error on the part of
the Special Referee was not cured by the statement in
the lower court's order that the judge had reviewed and
considered all of the "offers of proof made and the state-
ment of the attorney for the defendant as to other mat-
ters of proof he would have been able to have submitted,"
18. 230 S. C. 109, 94 S. E. 2d 237 (1957).
[Vol. 10
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saying: "but we do not think the error can be corrected
in this manner." Appellant was entitled to have the testi-
mony in the record for review by the Circuit Court and
this court.
Referring to the form of the report the Supreme Court
held:
The record further discloses another serious departure
from practice. Section 10-1412 provides: "the Referee
or Master must state the facts found and the conclusions
of law separately." Here the Referee made no effort to
state the facts found by him. . . as stated in Moore v.
Johnson, 7 S. C. 303, "the facts should be stated briefly,
distinctly and independently of any view taken of the
law of the case." It is only in this way that a case tried
before a Master or Referee can be intelligently reviewed
on appeal. (Emphasis and omissions mine.)
Service and Process
In Ward v. Miller, et al.,19 service was made on a non-resi-
dent motorist involved in an accident in this State by sending
copy of summons and complaint to the Chief Highway Com-
missioner as provided in Section 10-441, 1952 Code. After
20 days had elapsed defendant tendered an answer to plain-
tiff's counsel who declined to accept service because the time
had expired. Defendant then gave notice that he would move
the court for an order holding that he was not in default or,
in the alternative, allowing him to file answer. The motions
were denied. Defendant then appealed to Supreme Court
on the contention that where an agent designated by statute
accepts service of process double time should be allowed with-
in which to answer under the provisions of Section 10-465,
Code of Laws of 1952. The Supreme Court denied this con-
tention, saying:
We have found no statute relating to service upon the
Chief Highway Commissioner of the Summons and Com-
plaint which provides for double time. On the contrary,
Section 46-104 of the 1952 Code of Laws provides that
service of process upon the Chief Highway Commissioner
shall have legal force and validity as if served on the
defendant, personally. There can be no doubt that the
statutes . . . make the Chief Highway Commissioner
19. 230 S. C. 288, 95 S. E. 2d 482 (1956).
1957]
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an agent of the non-resident motorist. This Court has
likewise so held.
The Court held that the section doubling the time where
service was effected by mail was inapplicable for the further
reason that it did not apply historically to summons or other
process or of any paper to bring a party into contempt. Thus
the act had no application to the service of a summons by
mail.
In Bargesser v. Coleman Company20 the plaintiff at-
tempted to secure jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
by service upon a local dealer who purchased the corpo-
ration's products for resale. The corporation, appearing
specially, moved to dismiss such service on the grounds
that it was not doing business in the State, maintained no
office and had no agent within the State, and the person
served was not its agent. The trial judge denied the mo-
tion and held that the motion presented questions of fact
to be determined by a jury. The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court, saying:
The primary purpose of a motion of a foreign corporate
defendant to dismiss the service of a summons and com-
plaint upon its supposed agent is to question the juris-
diction of the Court, because the corporation is not do-
ing business in this State nor has it an agent upon whom
service can be made. It is not for a jury to say whether
the Court has jurisdiction but this should be decided
by the trial judge. The motion to dismiss is grounded
solely upon the alleged fact that the Court does not have
jurisdiction of the defendant. Matters of fact alleged
in a motion to dismiss, if controverted, must be deter-
mined by the Court.
Re-Opening Default Judgments
In Ward v. Miller2' the Supreme Court strictly enforced
the provisions of the law requiring that answer be served
within twenty (20) days after service of process and refused
to disturb the lower court's order denying the defaulting de-
fendant right to have the cases re-opened and to file an-
swer. Thus the Supreme Court considered Code Section 10-
609 (Code of Laws, South Carolina, 1952) which would have
20. 230 S. C. 562, 96 S. E. 2d 825 (1957).
21. 230 S. C. 288, 95 S. E. 2d 482 (1956).
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empowered the lower court "in its discretion and upon such
terms as may be just" to permit an answer to be filed after
time is run, but said:
A motion under the above quoted section was addressed
to the sound discretion of the Court and where the Court
refuses to allow an answer to be filed, the appellant in
order to prevail in this Court must show that there was
a clear abuse of discretion by the Trial Judge.
The Court then cited precedent that where the lower court
is invested with discretionary powers such power is absolute,
and, when exercised, is final since discretion is unlimited and
bounded by no rule except the good sense and integrity of
the party empowered to exercise it so that in the absence
of an express right to appeal it necessarily follows that its
exercise is unappealable. The Court held that the only ex-
ception to this rather strict rule was where there had been
an abuse of discretion, which the appellant had the burden
of proving.
Although it may appear to some that the Court had dealt
rather harshly with the errant defendant who unsuccessfully
sought leave in the lower court to file answer after the time
had expired the Supreme Court was more lenient in two cases
where defendants had suffered judgments by default several
years previously. These two decisions should be carefully
studied by counsel as the taking of default judgments is
rather a commonplace procedure particularly in many actions
on contracts such as foreclosure of mortgages and the like.
In Knight v. Martin22 the plaintiff had brought suit against
the defendant for goods sold and delivered by service of
summons and complaint on August 6, 1954. Nearly two
months later, October 2, plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit
of default and secured judgment thereon against the defend-
ant. One year and nine months later on 11th May, 1956,
defendant's counsel moved to vacate the judgment on grounds
not set out in the opinion. The Motion was denied by the
lower court whereupon the defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court, adverting to Section 10-1531 S. C. Code of Laws 1952
governing the rendition of judgments by default in actions
on contract, said:
It provides that when an action is for the recovery of
22. 230 S. C. 460, 96 S. E. 2d 473 (1957).
1957]
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 14
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss1/14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
money only, judgment may be given for the plaintiff by
default if the demand is unliquidated and the plain-
tiff itemized account, append thereto an affidavit that
it is true and correct, and that no part of the sum sued for
has been paid by discount or otherwise and a copy there-
of be served with the summons and complaint....
The statement attached to the complaint in this case is so
deficient, when measured by the requirements of the
statute, that it hardly needs discussion to conclude that
plaintiff was not entitled to judgment without proof
to the Court of his claim. The judgment is void and it
was error not to vacate it.
The Court refused to consider certain evidence which plain-
tiff's counsel had sought to add to the record at the time
of the Hearing below on the defendant's motion to vacate,
saying:
The validity of the judgment is to be tested by the status
of the action at the time of the rendition of the default
judgment, and it cannot be bolstered by facts dehors the
record as it existed at that time. (Emphasis and omis-
sions mine.)
The Supreme Court vacated and set aside the judgment.
Broome v. Broome23 also involved a failure by the plaintiff
to comply with the provisions of Section 10-1531, South Caro-
lina Code of Laws, 1952, and the lower court allowed the de-
fendants to re-open a default judgment taken against them
more than three years previously. The plaintiff's suit had
been for breach of an alleged contract whereby the defend-
ants were to pay him a weekly salary and a percentage of
the net profits of a certain business owned by the defendants.
Action was instituted around April 1, 1952 and on May 7, 1952,
plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit of default and, without
testimony, secured a judgment by default against the defend-
ants, based solely upon the summons and verified complaint,
and the affidavits of service and of default. The Circuit
Judge, whose order was adopted by the Supreme Court, held
that the plaintiff's claim of an alleged breach of contract was
not liquidated, and said:
The complaint does not contain an itemization of any
amount, nor is there any itemized claim attached to and
made a part of the complaint.
23. 230 S. C. 155, 94 S. E. 2d 439 (1956).
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Since plaintiff's claims for damages are principally un-
liquidated, his proof should have been made in open
court by the taking of testimony, and the failure to do
so warrants the relief demanded ....
The petitioner, or plaintiff, also challenges the right of
the respondent to move to vacate after a delay of ap-
proximately three years. The record does not reveal
when the defendants received notice of the rendition of
the default judgment, or the date when they had knowl-
edge thereof. As far as can be assumed from the showing
made, the petitioners are not guilty of any (un) reason-
able delay in moving to vacate. (Emphasis and omissions
mine.)
The Broome and Knight cases illustrate and emphasize
the need for strictly following the statute when securing de-
fault judgments in actions on contracts. It is to be noted
that in one of the cases the Supreme Court affirmed the
decree of the lower court allowing the defaulting defendant
the right to re-open and reversed the order of the lower court
in the other case when it denied the defendant the right to
re-open. On the other hand, in the tort case adverted to
in the beginning of this note the Supreme Court affirmed
the action of the lower court in denying the defaulting de-
fendant applications for leave to file answer even though
these applications were made shortly after the time for an-
swer had expired.
It is also rather strongly implied in the Broome case that
the defendants were entitled to notice of the rendition of the
default judgment against them. The case apparently throws
the burden on the party seeking to sustain the judgment to
show that the defendants are given notice of the judgment
or had knowledge thereof since in the absence of showing
such notice or knowledge the defendants were not charge-
able with unreasonable delay in waiting three years for mov-
ing to vacate the judgments taken against them.
Venue
In the case of Hodge v. Reserve Life Insurance Company,
24
a resident of Darlington County brought suit in that county
against a foreign insurance corporation for alleged fraud and
deceit in the sale to him of a policy of sickness insurance and
24. 229 S. C. 326, 92 S. E. 2d 849 (1956).
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in the receipt of premium thereupon after issuance. The de-
fendant moved for an order changing the place of trial to
Florence County upon the ground that the action was ex
delicto and it had no agent and maintained no office in
Darlington County. The lower court denied the motion under
Section 10-307 of the 1952 Code which provides in part "all
suits brought against . . . insurance companies doing busi-
ness in this State may be brought in the County where the
loss occurs .... " The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court and changed the place of trial to Florence County.
(This) is not an action for breach of the conditions of
the policies or for loss occurring thereunder ....
We think the phrase, "where the loss occurs" contemplates
loss from a casualty insured against under the terms of
the policy . . . . The action in hand is not for a loss
sustained under the policy referred to in the complaint,
but in tort for damages resulting from the alleged fraud,
deceit and misrepresentations as to the coverages of the
policies. (Omissions mine.)
In W. C. Caye and Company, Inc. v. Saul,2 5 the plaintiff
instituted a proceeding in Richland County to foreclose the
chattel mortgage against a defendant who was a resident of
Edgefield County but who had voluntarily surrendered the
chattel to the plaintiff in Richland County. The defendant
moved to transfer the place of trial to the county of his resi-
dence. The lower court denied the motion under its interpre-
tation of Section 10-301 1952 Code which provides inter alia:
Actions for the following causes must be tried in the
County in which the subject of the action . . . is situ-
ated...
(4) For the recovery of personal property distrained
for any cause.
The Supreme Court reversed the Order of the trial court
and directed that the venue be changed to Edgefield County,
the place of residence of the defendant, on the ground that
since the chattel in question had been voluntarily surrendered
to the plaintiff before the action was instituted, therefore
the action was hardly one for the recovery of personal prop-
erty. Rather, said the Court, the action was for the fore-
closure of a chattel mortgage.
We reached the conclusion that where an action is
25. 229 S. C. 306, 92 S. E. 2d 696 (1956).
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brought for the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, the
property embraced within said mortgage being in the
possession of the person instituting the action for fore-
closure, the case should be tried in the County of the resi-
dence of the defendant. (Insertions, emphasis and omis-
sions mine.)
Three other decisions relating to the place of trial of
actions present no unusual principle. The Court merely ap-
plied the rule recited many times that the moving party in
order to prevail must make a prima facia showing that both
the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be
promoted by the change, that motions of this kind must be
addressed to the lower court, whose rulings thereon will not
be disturbed unless the facts demonstrate that the court com-
mitted a manifest abuse of sound judicial discretion. Thus
in McCauley v. McLeod,26 the Supreme Court held that the
Circuit Judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to
transfer a cause to Kershaw County where the automobile
accident had occurred, from Clarendon County where the
case had previously been sent on motion of the defendant to
transfer the case to the place of his residence. In Dison v.
Wimbly, 27 the Court declined to reverse an Order of the lower
court returning the case to Dorchester County where the
accident had occurred and action had originally been brought
from Aiken County to which the proceeding had been trans-
ferred on motion of the defendant to transfer the place of
trial to the county of his residence. Again, in Jackson v.
Powers,28 plaintiff originally brought his action against the
defendants in Marion County, the place of their residence,
and then moved before the Circuit Judge to transfer the
place of trial to Marlboro County where the accident occurred
on the ground that the transfer would serve the convenience
of witnesses and promote the ends of justice. The Circuit
Judge granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed him
on the ground that the motion to change the place of trial
was addressed to the sound discretion of the judge who heard
it and his ruling thereon would not be disturbed except upon
a clear showing of that discretion "amounting to manifest
error of Law."
26. 230 S. C. 380, 95 S. E. 2d 611 (1956).
27. 230 S. C. 187, 94 S. E. 2d 877 (1956).
28. 230 S. C. 371, 95 S. E. 2d 624 (1956).
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